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Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation
Abstract
By now, everybody has heard of the `bourgeois public sphere,' that moment in history when a rising merchant
class felt empowered enough to deliberate public policy rationally and universalistically, and to transmit its
conclusions to the powers-that-were with the expectation of being taken seriously. By academic standards
Habermas's (1962/1989) thesis has become a household word, perhaps because it offers a nostalgic reminder
of a lost utopia of participatory democracy, or because it offers hope of what yet might be — if we could only
learn to translate the seventeenth century into the ostensibly compatible conditions of a modernity in which
widespread education, universal suffrage and the new communications technologies would seem to invite
such translation.
But this is not the whole of Habermas's thesis, nor its most original part. The rest of it revolves around the
`representative public sphere' which refers both to the period that preceded, and the period that followed, that
of the newly autonomous bourgeoisie. In the earlier period, it refers to the person of the monarch, to the
dazzle and charisma of his regalia, symbols of the legitimacy of his rule and the unity of his realm. That's not
such a new idea either.
What is new is Habermas's suggestion that the period following the `bourgeois public sphere' — that is, our
here and now — is essentially a return to the charisma of the `representative public sphere,' not that of the
absolute monarch to be sure, but of a political and economic establishment that has armed itself with image
makers and spin doctors who dazzle and charm in the name of the legitimacy and prerogatives of their clients.
As Calhoun (1992) puts it, summarizing Habermas, “By means of these transformations, the public sphere
has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational/critical debate.
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Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation1 
 
Elihu Katz 
 
 
By now, everybody has heard of the `bourgeois 
public sphere,' that moment in history when a rising 
merchant class felt empowered enough to deliberate 
public policy rationally and universalistically, and 
to transmit its conclusions to the powers-that-were 
with the expectation of being taken seriously. By 
academic standards Habermas's (1962/1989) thesis 
has become a household word, perhaps because it 
offers a nostalgic reminder of a lost utopia of 
participatory democracy, or because it offers hope 
of what yet might be — if we could only learn to 
translate the seventeenth century into the ostensibly 
compatible conditions of a modernity in which 
widespread education, universal suffrage and the 
new communications technologies would seem to 
invite such translation. 
 But this is not the whole of Habermas's thesis, 
nor its most original part. The rest of it revolves 
around the `representative public sphere' which 
refers both to the period that preceded, and the 
period that followed, that of the newly autonomous 
bourgeoisie. In the earlier period, it refers to the 
person of the monarch, to the dazzle and charisma 
of his regalia, symbols of the legitimacy of his rule 
and the unity of his realm. That's not such a new 
idea either. 
 What is new is Habermas's suggestion that the 
period following the `bourgeois public sphere' — 
that is, our here and now — is essentially a return to 
the charisma of the `representative public sphere,' 
not that of the absolute monarch to be sure, but of a 
political and economic establishment that has 
armed itself with image makers and spin doctors 
who dazzle and charm in the name of the 
legitimacy and prerogatives of their clients.2 As 
Calhoun (1992) puts it, summarizing Habermas, 
“By means of these transformations, the public 
sphere has become more an arena for advertising 
than a setting for rational/critical debate.  
Legislators stage displays for constituents. Special 
interest organizations use publicity to increase the 
prestige of their own positions, without making the 
topics to which these positions refer subjects of 
genuine public debate. The media are used to create 
occasions for consumers to identify with the public 
positions or personae of others. All this amounts to 
the return of a version of representative publicity, 
to which the public responds by acclamation, or the 
withholding of acclamation, rather than critical 
discourse.” 
 With that as a preface, this paper will proceed in 
three parts. Part One will develop the idea of the 
classic public sphere, drawing not so much on 
Habermas, but on some of his predecessors and 
others, and especially on the French social psy-
chologist, Gabriel Tarde. I will show how Tarde's 
conception of the public sphere applies not only to 
the newspaper but perhaps even more to broad-
casting. I will say a few words about how well the 
European model of public broadcasting fits (or 
better: used to fit) this vision of the public sphere. I 
will also introduce data from a recent American 
study that puts Tarde's scheme to an empirical test. 
 Then, I will shift gears. Still drawing on Tarde 
— but a different Tarde — Part Two will show 
another side of the same story, focusing more on 
the technology of the media, and their effect, not on 
individuals but on institutions. This part of the 
argument will show how the media, in succession 
— newspapers, radio, TV, internet — contribute not 
to the making of democracy, but to its unmaking. 
This part will lead to a discussion of our present 
situation of multi-channel television — over the air, 
on cable, via satellite — and the internet. To 
anticipate the climax of this part, let me say that we 
will find ourselves arguing that the new media are 
no longer geared to the nation-state and the public 
sphere. 
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 The concluding Part Three will try to confront 
the opposing tendencies of the two earlier parts. 
But it will do so in an academic effort at puzzle-
solving rather than as a statement of deep convic-
tion. The truth is I don't know the answers. 
 
Part I. 
 
Gabriel Tarde's Public Sphere 
 
The idea of a public sphere in which government is 
the addressee of a society of citizens did not 
originate with Habermas, of course. It is essentially 
a restatement of the emergence of a public opinion 
which, to my mind, was best characterized by Hans 
Speier (1950). Distinguishing private or clandestine 
opinion, from 'opinions disclosed to others', Speier 
conceives of public opinion as a two-fold process 
of communication whereby (1) citizens deliberate 
with each other over issues of public concern, and 
(2) transmit these deliberations to government. Like 
Habermas, Speier adds that the persons deliberating 
should not themselves be officials of the state and 
that their deliberations should be anchored in a 
shared belief both in freedom of expression and the 
right to be influential. The interweaving of opinion 
and communication also figures in de Tocqueville's 
(1935/1969) well-known interest in American 
associationism, in Lord Bryce's (1985/1991) 
observations about the press and conversation, and 
in other classic writings. 
 My own favorite is Gabriel Tarde, the French 
jurist, criminologist, and social psychologist whose 
turn-of-the-century essay, `Opinion and 
Conversation` (Tarde, 1901/1989) spells out the 
four elements of the public sphere: press, conver-
sation, opinion and action. I dare say that Tarde 
was not so much interested in a normative theory of 
democracy, but rather in observing how collective 
behaviour was pressed, willy nilly, into the service 
of democracy.1 There are several advantages to 
drawing on Tarde more than the others. First of all, 
he knows what a conversation sounds like. Unlike 
Habermas, Tarde alludes to the kinds of 
conversations that actually went on in cafes, 
coffeehouses, and salons. These are the familiar, 
intimate, aimless interchanges that wander in and 
out of political matters, but are by no means limited 
to them. The conversations, Tarde noted, go on 
among individuals who are rather similar to each 
other, both in status and in worldview. They are not 
what Habermas calls forth in his ideal speech 
situations; they do not involve 'bracketings` of 
status or acceptance of the rules of reason before 
setting foot in the public arena. Nor would they 
qualify for what Michael Schudson (1997) would 
call 'political talk,' which, in his view, is 
confrontational, and often painful, talk among 
ideological adversaries aiming toward legislation, 
as in parliaments. By contrast, Tarde's 
conversations are pleasurable, usually effortless.  
 A second advantage of calling on Tarde is that 
he treats the four elements of the public sphere as a 
linear system such that (1) the press, typically 
reporting on government, delivers an agenda of 
issues for discussion (2) to persons gathered in the 
cafes, coffeehouses and salons where talk goes on. 
These conversations (3) percolate opinions, 
clarifying them as they move from cafe to cafe and 
crystallize into one or two public opinions, which 
are translated (4) into action. By action, Tarde 
refers both to choice at the individual level — 
voting, for example, but also consumer choices — 
and the reactions of government to public opinion. 
Tarde's definition of action at the individual level is 
rather weak, limited as it is to making choices, but 
he is keenly aware of how the representation of 
consensual opinion by the press constitutes what he 
calls a “brake on government.” 
 A third advantage of Tarde is that he takes us 
beyond functional theory to the edge of techno-
logical determinism. From this point of view, the 
press is not just a purveyor of information or a 
supplier of agendas; it is also a powerful agent of 
nation-building. Tarde sees the press as an essential 
agent of national integration.  
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The shared language of the press and its circulation 
defines the nation's borders, and the shared 
experience of reading the day's agenda — aware 
that everyone else in one's orbit is doing the same 
thing at the same time — creates a sense of 
nationhood, what Benedict Anderson (1991) calls 
`imagined community.' 
 Tarde shows how this sense of shared mem-
bership also unified the parliament. Prior to the 
press, says Tarde, delegates of the several provinces 
each had veto power over the applicability of rules 
and laws to their particular constituencies. As the 
experience of community grew stronger, thanks to 
the press, majority rule was introduced, and became 
binding on all. 
 
Applying Tarde to Broadcasting 
 
A quarter of a century after Tarde's death, radio 
broadcasting was to begin. At the functional level, 
the new medium seemed a great step forward for 
participatory democracy, fulfilling the promise of 
simultaneity to which the press had aspired, 
enfranchising the less literate, and creating a new 
focus of shared experience of culture and of poli-
tics. Both the American and British models of how 
radio might be governed served these functions. 
The United States licensed individual stations 
which soon formed themselves into a small number 
of commercial networks to cover the entire country, 
purveying a diet of entertainment, and ultimately of 
news, and the advertising which paid the bills. 
 Britain explicitly rejected the American model, 
thanks to John Reith, who argued that the airwaves 
were not only public property, but a potential 
public utility which could build the nation as a 
shared community of culture and civic discussion. 
It was Reith, almost single-handedly, who 
persuaded the British government to transform the 
monopoly it had first given to an association of 
radio manufacturers into a public broadcasting 
authority which aimed to be independent both of 
government and of commerce (Briggs, 1961). The 
BBC was an important social invention. It is 
striking that a government should (by law and by 
convention) voluntarily relinquish its control of the 
airwaves in favour of a service of information, 
education and entertainment operated by 
professionals with a paternalistic orientation, 
overseen by an apolitical board of distinguished 
people, and owned, in effect, by a public of 
shareholders paying a quasi-tax directly to the 
Broadcasting Authority itself. It is something like 
the idea of a tax-supported public university, but 
riskier, inasmuch as the day-to-day mass produc-
tion of quality entertainment and critical discourse 
could, and sometimes does, turn against govern-
ment itself. 
 Cardiff and Scannell (1987) graphically de-
scribe how the new-born BBC began to invent 
traditions that would connect the several British 
regions to each other in the celebration of religious 
and civic holidays. It brought the periphery to the 
centre, and the centre to the periphery — in the 
King's annual Christmas message, for example. 
Even before the establishment of a broadcast news 
service — when the objections of newspapers were 
finally overcome, both in Britain and the U.S. — 
radio was a powerful agent of national integration, 
and in both World Wars served as the hallmark of 
togetherness. 
 After World War II, television followed in 
radio's footsteps as the medium of national inte-
gration, pushing radio into its new role as medium 
of segmentation and everyman's personal 
companion. Soon, there were radio stations for 
every age, status, and interest group, while televi-
sion took over as the national focus of culture and 
politics. Over the `objections' of the Frankfurt 
School (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972), who 
feared nothing as much as the homogenization of 
the culture of the classes, television did just that: it 
committed the crime of melding “Benny Goodman 
and the Budapest String Quartet” into a false 
consciousness of national unity, or, if we put 
hegemony aside, into just a plain fusion of national 
identity. 
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 Wherever broadcasting went, the norms of 
balance and fairness went with it. The American 
institution of pre-election television debates is an 
example of the ostensible rational/critical balance 
which television has brought to politics. The idea 
that the electorate should get a good look at the 
candidates in a rule-governed contest has now 
become virtually universal, and has spread even 
beyond the democracies. Altogether, it seems fair 
to say, with Ithiel Pool (1983), that democratic 
polities were well served by broadcasting — both 
radio and television — and that public broadcasting, 
perhaps especially in its monopolistic phase, 
provided both an agenda and a forum for the public 
sphere. 
 
An Empirical Example 
 
Lest you think this is all too pretty — you won't in a 
few minutes — I can document empirically that 
Tarde's system works. Together with Joohan Kim, 
my doctoral student, and Robert Wyatt, we have 
shown, for the United States, that there is indeed a 
linear relationship among press (that is, media), 
conversation, opinion, and action. The results of 
our national survey, published recently (Kim, 
Wyatt, Katz, 1999; Wyatt, Kim, Katz, 2000) 
demonstrate that the frequency of reading 
newspapers and, to a lesser extent, the frequency of 
viewing television news, increases political (and 
even personal) conversation. This is true after the 
obvious background variables, and even political 
interest, have been taken into account. You will not 
be surprised to learn that the most frequently 
discussed issues are crime and education, followed 
by the economy, local and national government, 
and lastly, foreign affairs. Family matters, 
entertainment and sports were more frequent 
subjects of discussion than most of the political 
issues, however. You may be surprised that the 
extent of viewing TV in general — not especially 
news — increased such personal, but not political, 
conversation. 
 The locus of discussion — of political as well as 
personal matters — is the home, followed by the 
workplace and civic organizations. Presumably, 
this reflects the home-centred character of the 
media, the protected environment of the home, and, 
not least, the evident fact that spouses seem to have 
begun to talk politics with each other.4 This means, 
of course, that political conversation is not often 
confrontational; it goes on among the like-minded. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that when crime 
and education are discussed at home, they are often 
moved out of the political and into the personal 
domain. In our study, restaurants, bars and 
shopping malls — today's equivalent of cafes — 
were not important loci of political conversation; 
neither was the internet. 
 Following Tarde, we then ask whether and how 
political conversation affects opinion. The answer 
is that it increases the number of issues on which 
people hold opinions, and equips discussants with 
the ability to offer more reasons in defence of their 
opinions. To our surprise, however, conversation 
does not appear to increase the consistency among 
an individual's opinions. 
 These measures of the quality of opinion con-
tribute, but not strongly, to political participation 
such as attending political meetings, working in 
political campaigns, contacting candidates by letter 
or by telephone, and voting. Political conversation, 
on the other hand, is a major contributory factor in 
political participation, along with being male, 
having higher income, and following the news. 
 Voilà. Participatory democracy is alive, and the 
media have a central share in its functioning. Or do 
they? 
 
Part II. 
 
Another Look at Tard 
 
If we take a second look, we will find another 
Tarde, less functionally oriented, and far more 
concerned with the effects of the media — the 
newspaper, in his case — on institutions.  
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To a certain extent, we might even say that Tarde is 
a technological theorist, anticipating McLuhan 
(1964), Innis (1950) and Eisenstein (1979), more 
interested in the medium than the message. Look-
ing back, we have already had a glimpse of this 
Tarde, in his discussion of the role of the news-
paper in national integration, both of the nation as a 
whole, and in the parliament, where the newspaper-
enriched sense of nationhood constrained majority 
rule. 
 But Tarde takes a further step in this role, in 
asserting that the newspaper overthrew the mon-
archy. His argument is based on the idea that only 
the king — the representative public sphere — had 
had knowledge of what was going on in the various 
villages and regions of his realm; he had spies and 
bureaucrats to tell him, and he was in no special 
hurry to let Village A find out what Village B was 
thinking. The newspaper did exactly this and 
thereby undermined the king, says Tarde: it made 
him redundant. 
 
Applying This Tarde to the Electronic Media 
 
If we apply this line of thinking to the media that 
succeeded the newspaper — radio, television, and 
now the internet — a new picture will emerge, very 
different from the one we have just seen. Radio, 
then television, not only displaced the newspaper, 
and each other, as the predominant medium of 
national integration; they not only served the public 
sphere functionally; they also — like the newspaper 
— gnawed away at the institutions of governance. 
 In the case of radio, first of all, we may note that 
the earliest political users of radio — in the United 
States and in Germany — were Roosevelt and, 
mutatis mutandis, Hitler. Soon after assuming 
office in the early ‘30s, Roosevelt began his series 
of fireside chats, through which he established an 
intimate relationship with families at home who 
responded, with warmth, to his plan for a New 
Deal, and, years later, to his attempt to persuade 
Americans that the United States must commit 
itself to an active role in World War II. Note that 
radio appeals went directly from the president to 
the people, over the heads of the Congress, creating 
a personalized leadership that ultimately led to 
what would be called, in Nixon's day, the `imperial 
presidency.' 
 Hitler, of course, went further. He simply 
disbanded the parliament and spoke directly to the 
people at mass rallies and over the radio. Victor 
Klemperer's (1998) diaries give us a glimpse of the 
ceremony that surrounded Hitler's harangues, and 
the diarist's fear of their effectiveness.5 Both leaders 
inspired a high rate of participation. But we see 
here the beginning of the erosion of the 
rational/critical ideal, and the weakening of the 
intermediacy of the parliament in favour of the 
charisma of the leader. Indeed, it looks like the 
king's revenge. The newspaper overthrew charisma, 
and radio reinstated it. 
 If we now apply this kind of analysis to tele-
vision, we see more of the same institutional 
slippage. It seems obvious that television finished 
what radio had begun. It moved politics inside the 
home. Although Hallin and Mancini have 
suggested that television news sends Italian viewers 
outside, in search of discussion and interpretation 
— in the piazza, at the trade-union hall or at party 
headquarters — it seems more likely that Lazarsfeld 
and Merton (1948) were right in proposing that 
broadcast news, typically, dies in the living room. 
True, our own research suggests that conversation 
follows viewing and that conversation often leads 
to political action, a lot remains to be done to 
validate the image of the home as a public place, 
and political action as a widespread phenomenon. It 
is too soon to abandon the idea that broadcast news 
may have a `narcotizing dysfunction' for most 
viewers. 
 A more radical formulation of this process 
would propose that television disintermediated the 
political party. Neighbourhood party organization 
has all but disappeared, and political allegiances 
have weakened substantially in the Western world 
(Lipset and Reinhard, 1992).  
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There is good reason to suppose, at the level of 
media ethics, that the even-handedness of 
television, and its visual imagery, have something 
to do with this — together with moving politics 
inside, of course. The huge viewership of American 
pre-election debates, for example, combats the 
selective attention of an earlier day. It used to be 
that one rallied, or read, or listened only to one's 
own side (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), whereas today's 
television debates invite attention to both sides 
equally (Kraus, 1962). And what one sees and 
hears is very centrist talk, and well-rehearsed 
sounds and images. As a result, the candidates seem 
almost equally acceptable. Neither party affiliation 
nor ideology is much on display, and programmes 
of action look and sound rather similar. 
 Ostensibly, the absence of political parties 
should not be at odds with Habermasian discourse, 
which strives for a rhetoric of reason; but it is hard 
to say that contemporary election campaigns, even 
television debates, epitomize rational interaction 
from which optimal answers for the commonwealth 
will likely emerge.6 Habermas, who fears all kinds 
of visual representation (Peters, 1993), would 
certainly agree. Calhoun (1992) quotes him as 
saying that “the sphere generated by the mass 
media has taken on the traits of a secondary realm 
of intimacy.” “We experience radio, film and 
television communication,” in Calhoun's 
paraphrase, with an immediacy far greater than that 
characteristic of the printed word. One of the 
effects of this on public discourse is that 
`bracketing' personal attributes and concentrating 
on the rational-critical argument becomes more 
difficult. This feeds into a more general 
sentimentality toward persons and corresponding 
cynicism toward institutions, which curtails the 
“subjective capacity for rational criticism of public 
authority, even where it might objectively still be 
possible.' A personalized politics revives 
representative publicity by making candidates into 
media stars.” 
 So, in the same way that newspaper overthrew 
the king, we may say that radio disintermediated 
the parliament in favour of the (elected) leader, and 
television undermined the political party, in favour 
of a politics of personality. What's next? 
 
The New Media Technology 
 
The new media technology have one outstanding 
characteristic: they no longer provide a medium of 
national integration. From a technologically 
deterministic point of view — that is, if the media 
affect political institutions in the way we have been 
arguing — the nation itself is dropping out of sight. 
 How so? First of all, we are witnessing the death 
of television as we knew it in the incredible 
multiplication of television channels. Thanks to the 
technological capacity of cable and satellite, plus 
the capitulation of governments to the behests of 
the media barons, the shared national experience of 
broadcasting is being dramatically impoverished. It 
is ironic to see how conservative governments, 
presumably committed to patriotism, succumb to 
the temptations of privatizing the broadcasting 
system and undermining the centrality of public 
broadcasting. Scandal and sensation seem to be by-
products of this populistic competition, and the 
news will soon be driven out of prime time. Indeed, 
we are witnessing a deep crisis in public 
broadcasting everywhere. Faced with the cruel 
choice of becoming an elitist channel for the 
politically and culturally  minded, or a mass 
channel that is hardly different from its private 
competitors, its future, even its survival, is very 
uncertain. 
 Even more striking is the proliferation of 
segmented channels, aiming for ethnic or religious 
audiences, or for specialty audiences interested 
only in sports, or arts, or news — but cut off from 
the majority of the population. The central arena, 
the public forum in which different kinds of people 
could talk to, or at least listen to, each other is 
fading away.  
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Both the mere multiplication of channels, and now 
the rise of specialized channels, are changing the 
character of public space. Television is no longer 
uniting us; it is a different medium, even if we 
continue to give it the same 40% of our leisure 
time. 
 And now the internet is rising rapidly as the 
predominant medium of communication, but 
certainly not as a medium of national integration. 
For the first time in 100 years, the nation is out of 
focus. With all its magnificent potential, the 
internet is geared toward transnational networks of 
communication — diasporas, if you like, and other 
particular interests — as well as the intimacy of 
private communication. Combined with a 
broadcasting capability, it has the potential of 
reaching a national audience, but it is unlikely to do 
so, or so it seems to me. 
 If one were to sum up the apparent `teleology' of 
present-day media, one might say that it has two 
tendencies — one toward individuation, the other 
toward globalization. Individuation means that the 
new media can tailor themselves and their messages 
to highly particularistic tastes: one can design the 
newspaper one wishes (`anything but the Middle 
East,' for example), or program for the tastes of a 
sub-group. Globalism means that certain messages 
and genres — the World Cup, or the Pope, or 
`Dallas' — can captivate everybody everywhere. 
Note that neither of these tendencies makes room 
for the nation-state. To the list of democratic 
institutions undermined by the electronic media — 
even while contributing to democratic participation 
— we can now add the nation itself: parliament, 
party, nation. Rhetorically, this adds to a pretty 
picture: the press consolidated the nation and 
defrocked charisma; the new media reinstated 
charisma and undermined the nation. 
 
Part III. 
 
Where Are We? 
 
Welcome to post-modernism. It is very difficult to 
decide where reality is. On the one hand, we have 
some evidence that the public sphere is functioning, 
from the American study I have reported,and from 
a Flemish study, which sounds similar. Many 
people keep up with politics; they are not as 
ignorant as is thought.7 They read newspapers and 
watch the TV news. They talk to others, and 
associate with them, in spite of the resonance of 
Putnam's thesis (1995).8 They form opinions on the 
issues of the day. They act — though only a 
minority do more than vote, and even voting is in 
decline.9 Fewer than half of all Americans actually 
present themselves at the polling places for national 
elections; ironically more watch the pre-election 
debates on TV. 
 On the other hand, we see that the institutions of 
democracy are faltering, and perhaps the media are 
partly to blame. The broadcast media, and now the 
internet, reach people at home, over the heads of 
the parliament, the political party, and even the 
nation. We wanted the media to be an independent 
voice, and to provide a platform, but within a 
shared constituency, not an amorphous mass 
society offering an illusory sense of empowerment. 
The message is consumerism, the cynical 
entertainment of political scandal, the PR of es-
tablishments, and the seductions of globalism. 
True, the internet provides much more opportunity 
for reaction and participation — it is a great 
medium for organizing a pressure group — but very 
few internet users seem to spend time on 
citizenship when they are on line. And creeping 
commercialism is rampant here too. 
 
I want to explore two implications that arise from 
this discussion, and to offer them not as conclu-
sions but as puzzles, as dilemmas for theory and 
research. 
 The first puzzle might be entitled `citizens 
without democracy', or in a more familiar form, 
`citizens without a nation'. This title reverses 
Robert Entman's (1989) Democracy Without 
Citizens, which implied that the system works 
reasonably well, even without much participation; 
this paper argues, instead, that there is participation, 
or what looks like participation, but that the 
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framework has collapsed. There are a lot of people 
treading the waters of participatory politics, but 
they aren't getting anywhere. Lazarsfeld and 
Merton's `narcotizing dysfunction' sums up this 
kind of ritualism by pointing to the heavy con-
sumers of news who delude themselves into be-
lieving that they are `in' politics, while their 
attentiveness, conversation, even their opinions, do 
not get beyond the living room. There is a short-
circuit, in other words. Many citizens are 
performing their responsibilities, or trying to, but 
the mechanisms for communicating and aggregat-
ing their actions have somehow eroded. 
 The missing links are the institutions: the 
voluntary organizations, the trade unions, the 
political parties, the parliament who, ironically, are 
being experienced as psychologically more distant, 
even if communication with them is ostensibly 
easier, not more difficult. Political institutions are 
weakened, and the public sphere itself — as 
embodied in the media, at least — is being 
commercialized, addressing audiences as consum-
ers rather than citizens. In spite of Inglehart (1997), 
egoism and materialism are rampant; the shopping 
mall has outdistanced the public square, the town 
meeting, the legislature and the political party. 
People have more confidence in commercial 
organizations than in political ones, including 
journalism (Wyatt, unpublished). We appear to be 
creeping back to the classic mass society model 
where charismatic leaders and masses had unme-
diated access to each other (Kornhauser, 1959). 
Now, even the leaders have lost moral authority. 
 Perhaps one of the two parts is simply incorrect. 
A cursory review of the evidence would suggest 
that part one — on citizen participation — is the 
better supported, but part two — on institutional 
failure — is more convincing. If they are both true, 
how else can the two pieces of this puzzle be 
reconciled? Is there a better way? 
 The second puzzle is related. Its ultimate con-
cern is with the future of public broadcasting. It 
will argue, from part one, that citizens would want 
to strengthen public broadcasting, and from part 
two, that the institutions for accomplishing this are 
out of reach, or non-existent. 
 The way to think about this, in my opinion, is to 
note the symbiotic relationship between the 
structure of the media and structure of society, 
without prejudging (as part two tended to do) 
which comes first. Israel is the case I know best. 
During the strongly collectivistic nation-building 
phase of the society, there were plural social 
movements, each rallied around a newspaper, 
pursuing a common goal in radically different 
ways, but united around monopoly broadcasting, 
first radio then television. During the trying days of 
the radio era, people followed the news on the hour, 
and discussed it in the streets, at work, at 
community and party and union meetings, and at 
home. Television gathered everybody — and I 
mean everybody, or almost everybody — for the 9 
p.m. news. It was an unwritten rule not even to 
make telephone calls during these 30-40 minutes, 
and to be prepared to discuss the agenda next 
morning at work. With greater security and pros-
perity, materialism and egoism gained ground. This 
was reflected in the rise of consumerist institutions, 
and, in parallel, the introduction of a second 
advertising-based, commercial TV channel. Later, 
when separatist yearnings began to displace 
pluralism with multiculturalism, we observe the rise 
of specialized broadcasting channels, and a gradual 
retreat from major channels. Most viewing, as 
Curran (1998) insists for the UK, is still with the 
two over-the-air channels, but my bet is that this 
will gradually dissipate — unless a crisis, or better a 
basketball game, brings us together again as a 
nation. The structure of nation and media are 
closely interlinked, not only in Israel. 
 True, a strong broadcasting system can hold a 
nation together. But let us now add: only if it wants 
to be held together. In spite of the technological 
flavour of this paper, I am afraid that the latter is 
prerequisite to the former. For public broadcasting, 
this means that “it takes a nation.”  
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The vigour of culture and broadcasting in Quebec 
provides an interesting contemporary example. 
 Let me reiterate what we mean, or used to mean, 
by public broadcasting. It is a media system (1) 
based on a society of shareholders — a citizenry 
that owns, and feels that it owns, the system. It is 
(2) administered by a board of trusted, civic-
minded, and creative people who protect it 
jealously against the infringements of government 
and commerce. It is (3) staffed by professionals 
whose motto is that the customer — that is, the 
citizen — is not always right, but needs to be well 
served. Its programming is guided (4) by criteria of 
quality and relevance, with an eye to the continuity 
of cultures of the nation and of the groups that 
constitute it, (5) by concern for diversity of 
expression — even competing news programmes 
are thinkable, for example, and (6) by a 
commitment to broadcast news and public affairs in 
prime time. Its hallmark is (7) that the plurality of 
groups and interests that make up the society see 
and hear each other in the same arena — on matters 
of civics and of culture — along with the 
professional voices of broadcasters and experts. 
From which it follows (8) that it is viewed by 
everybody, more or less. Incidentally, this is why 
one can argue that a monopoly public       
system — a one-channel society — may be more 
democratic than a multi-channel one. 
 I repeat, to reinstate this kind of broadcasting 
system would seem to require a renewed commit-
ment to the idea of nation. Pluralism to be sure, but 
an imagined community of shared identity along 
with institutions that make it work. 
 Transnational identities, multinational interests, 
and the technologies of communication may be 
making the nation superfluous. With it, the will for 
a nation may wither. New social arrangements may 
be making for new forms of identity and new 
structures of participation that will displace the 
kinds of allegiance and investment — emotional 
and rational — that accompanied national 
citizenship. The nation may be reduced to a mere 
administrative unit, defined geographically for 
convenience. Perhaps that might even make for a 
better world, one that spares us from the excesses 
of nationalism. 
 The puzzle with which I leave you is whether 
there is any other way to reinstate the kind of public 
broadcasting which would suit the apparent desire 
for a participatory democracy, and whether the idea 
of repairing the nation in order to repair public 
broadcasting isn't asking too much. 
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N otes 
1.This is one of a series of overlapping papers seeking to develop appropriate concepts for treating the social implications 
of new media technologies. Previously published papers include Katz (1992), Katz (1996), Katz (1998b). 
2.Daniel Boorstein (1964) was one of the first to make this point. 
3.On the development of Tarde's thought, especially the transition from crowds to publics, see Clark (1969), Moscovici 
(1985) and van Ginneken (1992). 
4.In the Columbia voting studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), women were influenced by men, usually husbands, far more than 
men were influenced by women. 
5.In one passage, Klemperer (1998) expresses surprise that Hitler's speech did not command attention in a public place. 
6.There is much to be said in defence of these debates, nevertheless. See Kraus (1962). 
7.For a discussion of what American citizens do and don't `know,' see Delli Carpini(1996). 
8.Several studies seriously dispute Putnam’s generalization that there is a decline in organizational membership in the 
United States. Nevertheless, his thesis has attracted widespread interest, and `sounds' convincing to many. 
9.Michael Schudson (1998) and other theorists are less concerned over the decline in citizen participation, if there is one. 
They believe that representative democracy locates political debate where it belongs, in the parliament, and that citizens 
should oversee the performance of their representatives and give support, or withdraw it, at the polls. 
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